Edited by James Sennett, this collection of articles by Alvin Plantinga is certainly deserving. The problem facing Sennett, however, is how to choose articles from an author whose writings span forty years of reflection. Fortunately, in Plantinga's after-word to this book, he approves of Sennett's choice. Plantinga states that the selection is a “snapshot” of his work thus far in the philosophy of religion, one that represents two major concerns: negative apologetics and the development of Christian (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Sets of contingent objects, perhaps, are as contingent as their members; but properties, propositions, numbers and states of affairs, it seems, are objects whose non-existence is quite impossible. If so, however, how are they related to God? Suppose God has a nature: a property he has essentially that includes each property essential to him. Does God have a nature? And if he does, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? How is God related to such (...) abstract objects as properties and propositions? These are the questions I want to explore. - Introduction. (shrink)

The following is a synopsis of the paper presented by Alvin Plantinga at the RATIO conference on The Meaning of Theism held in April 2005 at the University of Reading. The synopsis has been prepared by the Editor, with the author’s approval, from a handout provided by the author at the conference. The paper reflects on whether religious belief of a traditional Christian kind can be maintained consistently with accepting our modern scientific worldview. Many theologians, and also many (...) scientists, maintain that the idea of divine intervention is at odds with the framework of natural laws disclosed by science. The paper argues that this notion of a ”religion/science problem’ is misguided. When properly understood, neither the classical (Newtonian) picture of natural laws, nor the more recent quantum mechanical picture, rules out divine intervention. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with, or even calls in to question, special divine action, including miracles. (shrink)

I try to clear up a couple of misunderstandings in William Craig’s review. The first has to do with the difference between what I call “Historical Biblical Criticism” and historical scholarship. I claim there is conflict between the first and Christian belief; I don’t for a moment think there is conflict between historical scholarship and Christian belief. The second has to do with Platonism, theism and causality. I point out that theism has the resources to see abstract objects as (...) like divine thoughts, in which case they are not causally isolated; this offers a reply to Paul Benacerraf’s suggestion that if, as on Platonism, abstract objects are causally isolated from everything, then there is no way in which we could come to know them or anything about them. (shrink)

This paper examines and comments on roderick chisholm's "parts as essential to their wholes", "review of metaphysics", Volume 26, 1973.

Plantinga’s God and Other Minds, Reformed Epistemology articles, and Warrant Trilogy are all part of the same epistemological project. Although the project develops in phases focusing progressively on anti-theism, evidentialism, and internalism, the epistemology is consistently a Reidian particularism. It follows Roderick Chisholm’s famous particularist strategy for finding an epistemic criterion, uses principles of common sense from Thomas Reid as clear cases of beliefs satisfying that criterion, and applies that criterion to belief in God in order to show that (...) this belief is epistemically respectable. Understanding this will help to clarify Plantinga’s philosophical contributions to our understanding of religious belief. In my article I introduce Plantinga’s epistemological sources, explain the structure of his project, overview its development in these three phases, and correct some misunderstandings of Plantinga that arise from inattention to his Reidian particularism. I also show how Reidian particularism itself suggests an improvement to Plantinga’s epistemology which his critics often recommend: that we recognize that evidence for the existence of God, even if it is not necessary for theistic belief to be warranted, may yet be valuable. (shrink)

The author replies to Michael Tooley's comments ('Alvin Plantinga and the argument from evil', Australasian journal of philosophy, December 1980) on his treatment of the argument from evil in The nature of necessity; he argues that Toole's remarks constitute at best a mere galimatias.

My question is simple: how shall we Christians deal with apparent conflicts between faith and reason, between what we know as Christians and what we know in other ways, between teaching of the Bible and the teachings of science? As a special case, how shall we deal with apparent conflicts between what the Bible initially seems to tell us about the origin and development of life, and what contemporary science seems to tell us about it? Taken at face value, the (...) Bible seems to teach that God created the world relatively recently, that he created life by way of several separate acts of creation, that in another separate act of creation, he created an original human pair, Adam and Eve, and that these our original parents disobeyed God, thereby bringing ruinous calamity on themselves, their posterity and the rest of creation. (shrink)

First, I'd like to thank Professors Van Till, Pun, and McMullin for their careful and thoughtful replies. There is a deep level of agreement among all four of us; as is customary with replies and replies to replies, however, I shall concentrate on our areas of disagreement. In the cases of Van Till and McMullin, this may give an impression of deeper disagreement than actually exists. In the case of Pun it leaves me with little to say except Yea and (...) Amen; I find no serious disagreement between us. (shrink)

A prominent analytic philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, here writes on one of our biggest debates—the compatibility of science and religion. I will begin this review by summarizing the contents of the book. I will then comment specifically on certain entailments of the title and give some general constructive criticisms of the text. Finally, I will remark about its potential readership. Notably, this book originated as Gifford Lectures, entitled “Science and Religion: Conflict or Concord?” at the University of St. (...) Andrews in 2005.Plantinga’s overall theme is that there is a superficial conflict but deep concord between science and religion, but superficial concord and deep conflict between science and naturalism. In the preface, Plantinga stipulates that one can be an atheist without rising to the full heights of naturalism, but one cannot be a naturalist without being an atheist . In Part I, composed of four chapters considering Al .. (shrink)

This is especially clear in the case of Jean Paul Sartre's philosophy of freedom. Existentialists in general and Sartre in particular argue that an analysis, not of human nature, indeed, but of, say, "the universal human condition" reveals that certain kinds of behavior are morally appropriate and others morally reprehensible. My aim in this paper is to show that Sartre's analysis of "the universal human condition" is quite inconsistent with morality in anything like the ordinary sense. We might think that (...) attempt otiose in view of Sartre's notorious rejection of "absolute values." But in spite of his claim to dispense with absolute morality, Sartre's philosophy, like other existentialist philosophies, is through-and-through ethical. A concern with the human condition and its implications for morality is the moving force behind Sartre's thought. "Bad faith," "responsibility," "anguish,"--these and other ethical notions play a central role in Sartre's philosophy of freedom. Though he has in one sense rejected "absolute values" in another sense he accepts the absolute values of authenticity and good faith, recommends these values to others, and passes moral judgment upon those who live in "bad faith.". (shrink)

The author criticizes an article by c b martin called "the perfect good." the author shows that martin's argument, That the theologians' argument is a contradiction, Does not hold. (staff).

The analogical position, as traditionally understood, is the claim that a person can inductively infer the existence of other minds from what he knows about his own mind and about physical objects. Of course this body of knowledge must not include such propositions about physical objects as "that human body over there is animated by a human mind," or "this automobile was designed by a human mind"; nor could my evidence for the existence of other minds be that I have (...) it on the authority of some of the best minds in the country. The body of knowledge in question must not entail that there are any other minds. In "Induction and Other Minds" I used the term "total evidence" to refer to this body of knowledge, defining that term as follows. (shrink)

The deepest beliefs’ about personal identity whose consequences Unger seeks to draw out are the beliefs of those who already share his theoretical convictions; and his pain-avoidance’ experiments show nothing unless one already assumes those convictions. If there is a risk’ that I may not survive a brain operation even though I know exactly which chunks of brain will be removed and replaced, that shows that I am a separate thing from my body and brain, about which the latter provide (...) normally reliable, but still fallible evidence. (shrink)